



Proposals for the establishment of ombudsmen in American
federal, state, and local government are in vogue. In Ohio bills
were introduced by members of both political parties in the 107th
General Assembly (1967-1968) providing for the creation of the
office of Ombudsman. While these proposals were not enacted,
the high level of interest in ombudsmen promises re-introduction.
The prospect that such legislation will pass and that Ohio will
have an Ombudsman in the future is not presently measurable.
For now, Ohio is leading rather than lagging among the states to
consider ombudsmen, but its ultimate determination to adopt or
not to adopt the ombudsman system must await a better formation
of opinion by the public and by law-makers.
The idea of an official administrative critic, an ombudsman,
is novel to American government systems. It is a function that is
proving immensely successful, however, in a number of other coun-
tries which have administrative agency systems not unlike those
of our federal, state, and local governments.' The ombudsman
system of a singular, independent, respected official, with power to
investigate a broad range of administrative complaints and the ex-
pert status to warrant official and public attention to his recom-
mendations, merits serious consideration by American state gov-
ernments. It could be an economical and effective method for
maintaining and improving an already sound administrative law
system. To advocate an ombudsman is not to criticize the present
administrative agency system or the present administrators. Om-
budsman is a device for the cure of interstitial ills in the present
administrative law system. As pointed out by Professor Walter
Gellhorn, America's leading commentator on ombudsmen, an om-
budsman can function well only when the state is already possessed
of sound government institutions and a good civil service, as his
powers are quite limited.2
Distinct from the merits of ombudsman on the federal level,
there is particular utility in an administrative critic with juris-
* Member of the Ohio Bar.
1 See W. GELLHON, WHEN AmMUCANS COAMIUN 212-32 (1966) [hereinafter cited
GEuoRaN, AmEmcANs].
2 Id. 132.
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diction over state and local agencies.3 The ordinary person is per-
haps affected more by state and local agency action than he is by
federal agency action. Such state and local action is likely to con-
cern matters of little public impact and small dollar amounts
which are of immediate personal importance to the individual.
For the affected individual, the procedural apparatus of judicial
review is too costly, too slow and too poorly understood to perform
its function of assuring due process and reasonable administrative
action. Thus, the person with a complaint about his driving license,
his unemployment, his workmen's compensation or welfare claim,
garbage collection, his child's teacher, street maintenance, or his
treatment by police or prison officials may be effectively without
any remedy. He may complain, and if sufficiently vocal he may
receive redress at executive or legislative instance. Nevertheless, he
will likely find the mayor, the county commissioner, or the gov-
ernor, however sensitive to a dissatisfied citizen, and however much
an "approachable potentate,"4 unwilling to upset the work of an
agency whose chief officials serve at his pleasure.5 It is also likely
that his state representative, whose staff, salary, and time are se-
verely limited in comparison to his congressman, cannot handle
his complaint.
In addition to the dose identification of the executive with
administrative agencies and the part-time nature of most legislative
bodies, at both the state and local level,6 there is an inherent defect
in redress through executive or legislative sources. Help from these
sources is almost invariably accomplished by special treatment.
However effective for the complainant, such favoritism is not con-
ducive to sound administration. It is often a bending of lawful
standards and procedural safeguards which puts the complainant
ahead of rather than equal to others. Review by an ombudsman
with some expertise, but no powers to compel redress, could satisfy
a complainant without depreciating the administrative system, and
without the undesirable side effects of pressure and undue blame
on elective officeholders.
Notwithstanding the possible benefits of ombudsmen, it must
3 See id. 131-32; MooRE, State Government and the Ombudsman, OTmuvs mN Fop.
AmERICAN GOVERNMENT? 70-100 (S. Anderson ed. 1963); Unruh, The Need for an
Ombudsman in California, 53 CALIF. L. Rnv. 1212 (1965).
4 GELLHORN, AMmuCANs 161.
G See, e.g., OrIo REV. CODE ANN. § 121.03(A) (Page Supp. 1967) (administrative
department heads serve terms concurrent with appointing governor and at his pleasure).
6 See generally GELLHORN, AmERCANs 157-59.
[Vol. 30
OMBUDSMAN IN OHIO
be noted that ombudsmen are doubtful cure-alls7 By nature they
are rather toothless watchdogs whose advisory growl is frequently
ignored by administrators aware of their relative impotence. It
would seem from the Danish and New Zealand experience that
their success might depend to a large degree on the personality of
the incumbent.3 There is a very real danger that the confidence
of the public and administrators alike might be soured by an un-
fortunate selection, particularly that of an initial ombudsman.
The establishment of a state ombudsman would be a relatively
cheap reform, however, and when properly established, an om-
budsman could do little harm if unsuccessful and much good if the
foreign experience prevails.
Ombudsman legislation has been introduced in more than
a half dozen states, Connecticut, California, Illinois and New York
among them, and has been enacted in Rhode Island and Hawaii.
It is too early to know whether these newly created ombudsmen will
be able to accomplish the desired purpose, but further enactments
creating state ombudsmen can reasonably be expected. In Ohio,
there was the bi-partisan introduction of ombudsmen legislation in
the last legislative session, and memories of the Ohio Bar Associa-
tion's Administrative Law Committee proposal for an administra-
tive court for Ohio9 to evidence a felt need for review reform in
Ohio administrative law. The question of whether this need can
be met by adoption of the ombudsman institution in Ohio will be
examined in the following discussion. The merits and mechanics
of adopting an office of Ombudsman will also be considered.
Much has been written about ombudsmen and other admin-
istrative critics in other nations and about the adaptability of the
institution to American governmental systems. Consideration of
these matters will therefore be limited to a brief description of the
foreign institutions and their present, functional, American coun-
terparts.
II. AN INVENTORY OF OMBUDSMEN, OVERSEERS, AND OTHER
ADMINISTRATIVE CRiTICS
The supervision and review of administrative agency proce-
dures and decisions in modern societies are conducted by a variety
7 See generally id. at 224-32.
8 See W. GEi.HORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTmEs: CITIZENS' PROTECTORS IN NINE
CouNTRIFs 5-47, 91-153 (1966) [hereinafter cited GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN].
9 See Fulda, A Proposed "Administrative Court" for Ohio, 22 Omo ST. L.J. 734
(1961).
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of institutions. The legislatures which create the agencies and
prescribe their general powers, the procedural codes which govern
them, and the executives who are charged generally with public
administration, exercise an ultimate sort of oversight.10 But the
kind of control that is of immediate importance to the ordinary
person is that exercised by the body to which he must turn in a
dispute with an administrative agency.
In the United States such remedial control of federal, state,
and local agencies is primarily exercised by the courts." If the
complainant has exhausted his administrative remedies and joined
a legal issue with the administrators,12 it is to the courts, possibly
through a specialized bar,' 3 that he must turn. In France and West
Germany, and to a certain extent in Sweden, such control is exer-
cised by a specialized administrative court system, the Conseil
d'Etat and the Verwaltungsgerichten, a refinement on the American
system.14 In Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
Yugoslavia, Poland, U.S.S.R. and Japan, the citizen can seek re-
dress for administrative grievances through an official administra-
tive critic, whose powers are more or less limited.' 5
There are three distinct types of administrative critics func-
tioning in these latter societies: the ombudsman, the procurator,
and the administrative inspector. Both the procuratorial system and
the administrative inspection system involve multiple critics and
a decentralized organization, the formidable bulk and cost of which
precludes their serious consideration for American state adoption,
even though they might be effective. 16 It may be an oversimplifi-
10 See GWYN, Transferring the Ombudsman, OMBUDSMEN FOR AMERICAN GoVERN-
mENT? 37, 53-58 (S. Anderson ed. 1968). See generally W. GELuoau & C. BYsE, ADMINiS-
TRATIVE LAW 82-212 (4th ed. 1960).
11 Compare Administrative Procedure Act, 5 US.C. §§ 1001-11 (1964) with, e.g.,
Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 119.0-.13 (Page 1953) as amended, (Page Supp., 1967) (adminis-
trative procedure). See also OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2506.01-.04 (Page Supp., 1967)
(appeal from local agency).
12 See W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, supra note 10, at 260-64.
13 See C. HoaRSY, TnE WASHINGTON LAWYER ch. II (1952).
14 See G. SAWYER, OMBUDSMEN 15-17 (1964); Gr.T.HORN, A1mr=mCANs 37-39. See also
Fulda, supra note 9.
15 GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN 421-39. This excellent, recent study examines the origin,
processes, and effect of administrative critics in nine nations. For material on the
adoption of an ombudsman system in a common law country, see id. at 91-153 (New
Zealand); G. SAWYER, OMBUDSMEN 25-34 (1964); ROWAT, The Spread of the Ombuds-
man Idea, OMBUDSMEN FOR AmEmCAN GOVERNMENT? 7, 18-25 (S. Anderson ed. 1968).
16 See GELLHORN, AMERICANS 5-13.
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cation to describe the procuratorial system as a prosecuting at-
torney who has the additional duty of scouring the halls of gov-
ernment as well as the streets and countryside for business. 17 Such
a system is sanction rather than remedy oriented, but it assures
that a faithless public servant is not lightly dealt with as a member
of the government team. By contrast, the Japanese administrative
inspection system18 employs respected lay leaders in multiple offi-
ces who smooth the course of administration for the less able.' 9
Together with the singular ombudsman, these two kinds of
official critics are characterized by (1) independence from the leg-
islative and executive authorities, (2) possession of extensive in-
vestigatory powers and (3) the use of reasoned opinions to achieve
results by persuasion rather than by decree.20 In addition to these
officially constituted critics, quasi-official and unofficial critics pres-
ently function as checks on administration in most political units.
Perhaps foremost of these is the press, which is given quasi-official
standing to participate in the administrative process in Poland2l
and which functions as a voluntary critic elsewhere, not infre-
quently involving itself in individual disputes. Bar association com-
mittees concern themselves with administrative procedure and var-
1.7 See id. at 536-71.
1s See id. at 372-420.
19 Although beyond the scope of this article, the Japanese administrative inspec-
tion system warrants study as a useful model upon which two current American needs
might be fulfilled: (1) employment in a socially useful manner of a vast and increasing
number of retired persons, whose education, skill, and experience is a largely un-
tapped resource, and (2) dissemination of advice and guidance to the uneducated,
inexperienced, and disadvantage persons in the lower socio-economic, largely city-
dwelling groups. These latter citizens are the subjects of a great deal of administrative
action or inaction in the execution of existing governmental programs at all levels
relating to education, employment, and welfare. Their complaints based on nothing
more than lack of information bulk large among those received by agencies charged
with administering such programs. Inarticulate and uninformed on how to complain
effectively, many such persons must bear unaired grievances against government and
the resulting disaffection indistinguishable from that engendered by unremedied
administrative error.
While public information is properly a function of the agency and not that of a
reviewer of agency action, a breakdown in information causes the same sort of griev-
ance and loss of confidence in government as maladministration and must be treated
in the same manner, whether by administrative critic, executive, or legislature. Em-
ployment of retired persons, on the Japanese model, to assist in the information func-
tion would lift this burden from administrator and reviewer alike, and conserve their
energies for the resolution of real disputes.
20 See GELLnORN, AMER ANs 9-10.
21 See GEmaoRN, OMtsEN 321-27.
1969]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
ious private citizens' organizations interest themselves in public
administration generally. However, such groups cannot be con-
sidered a practical source of redress for the individual complain-
ant. Like the official foreign critics, these latter bodies are indepen-
dent of the power exercising branches of government, and they
influence the administrative process by persuasion and the de-
velopment of opinion. Unlike an official critic, however, they often
lack any real fact-finding ability, and, since they are privately fi-
nanced, they lack the stability of a government institution such
as an ombudsman. As a source of redress for the ordinary citizen,
unofficial groups are unreliable because they are usually interested
in public administration only in a broad sense. They are not case
oriented. They cannot apply their limited time, influence, or funds
to the resolution of a relatively petty grievance of the kind typically
considered by an ombudsman.
Curiously, the groups that point to themselves as the real
ombudsmen in America are the federal, state, and local legislators
and executives, in their individual capacities as responsive, elected
officials. Congressmen, mayors, and indeed the administrative agen-
cies themselves have said in response to ombudsman proposals that
they are already performing the function of an ombudsman and
therefore none is required.2 2 Undeniably such officials secure reso-
lution of a vast number of minor grievances. This constituent work
is an integral part of political life. It could be delegated, but never
fully transferred to an ombudsman, for complaints will continue
to come to elected officials and no ombudsman would be able or
have reason to dampen this opportunity to cut political hay. There
are two reasons constituent work does not make these officials om-
budsmen.
First, many potential complainants believe constituent work
to be partisan. Right or wrong, it is the belief that matters. The
aggrieved citizen who thus withholds complaint or complains with-
out full satisfaction then bears two unaired grudges against his
government. Second, such officials have a divided responsibility
which makes it difficult to separate their individual leadership role
from their roles as creators or supervisors of the agency apparatus
about which there is complaint. The congressman, the state bureau
of inspection 23 or the mayor may assume to be inspectors general
22 See GELLHORN, AMERICANs 57-58, 104-21, 157-70; GwYN, supra note 10, at 49-59.
23 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 117.01-.18 (Page 1953), as amended, (Page Supp. 1967)
(bureau of inspection and supervision of public offices).
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of government, but they cannot be detached from administrative
agencies because they are not independent of the responsibility for
administration. They cannot therefore achieve the kind of respect
that supports acceptance by citizens and administrators alike of an
ombudsman's findings and recommendations.
III. OMBUDSMANIA
As the unofficial administrative critics are only occasional
ombudsmen, the elected officials and their representatives are spu-
rious ombudsmen. The epithet is not employed in these descrip-
tions to depreciate the service of these groups in entertaining and
working on resolution of citizens' complaints about administrative
agencies. Instead, it is used to highlight a habit of imprecision
that has developed as the idea of adopting ombudsmen has spread
in America.
The habit to be discouraged is that of thinking that anyone
who receives complaints is an ombudsman. Such ombudsmania
occurs in a less virulent form when, upon observing the results of
a narrow sample of cases, it is concluded that any officer capable of
securing any measurable satisfaction is functioning as an ombuds-
man. The danger in this kind of thinking is that any number of
government complaint departments may be created or re-desig-
nated within existing government departments and labeled om-
budsmen without the constitutive characteristics of true ombuds-
men. Alternatively, it might be concluded that an ombudsman is
undesirable because existing institutions are engaged in the busi-
ness of complaints. We shall then have missed the point entirely
and lost whatever benefits ombudsmen might have offered Amer-
ican governments.
True ombudsmen are hybrid institutions. They do not readily
admit to classification as legislative, executive or judicial institu-
tions. They are something of all of these as are the administrative
agencies they guard. If an ombudsman were established within
the legislative or executive branches of American government, he
would necessarily lack the quasi-judicial independence requisite
to public and governmental respect for his opinions and recom-
mendations, and would function only as a public relations or ad-
visory office for such branches. If an ombudsman were created
without investigatory powers there would be no basis for acceptance
of his opinion as he would be no better informed than any other
governmental or private commentator. If he were given powers to
1969]
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compel redress, he would be no more than a super-administrative
agency or a special court. The requirements of procedural due process
would obviate the ombudsman's ability to avoid the cost, delay and
complexity of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. If any one of
the three characteristics, independence, investigatory power, or ab-
sence of revisory jurisdiction, is missing in an ombudsman proposal,
such scheme would be essentially duplicating existing government
institutions. Such variants may be desirable reforms, but they are
not true ombudsmen as they are working successfully in other na-
tions.
It is the successful foreign ombudsman rather than an un-
tested counterfeit that warrants consideration by 'American gov-
ernments, particularly the states. This does not mean that the
Danish or New Zealand ombudsmen, which are models of effective-
ness, can be lifted intact and adopted by American states. The
political and social differences between the nations having om-
budsmen and American states requires that adaptations be made.
What is imperative is that adaptation be made without substan-
tially altering the essential constitutive characteristics of an om-
budsman.
IV. AMERICAN STATE PROPOSAIS
The remarkable thing about the accumulated literature on
ombudsmen is not the near unanimity of opinion that it is a good
thing, for new ideas are spread by advocates and not by opponents.
It is that there is no serious difficulty in adapting ombudsman to
the American state. The model ombudsman acts and the legisla-
tion introduced in several state legislatures support the consensus
that ombudsman can be adapted to state use without loss of essen-
tial elements, at least as far as the mechanics of these statutes are
concerned. The Ohio bills, following closely a model act, appear
to preserve the characteristics which have made foreign ombuds-
men successful while incorporating changes necessitated by the
nature of state governments.
A. Adapting Ombudsman to State Government
If the courts leave something to be desired as a source of re-
dress for citizens because of the cost and delay occasioned by the
bulk of judicial proceedings, the judiciary is nevertheless an ex-
cellent model from which to fashion an American state ombuds-
man. While the courts lack initiative and the ability to respond to
[Vol. so
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a minimally formal or perhaps less than legally cognizable com-
plaint,24 their tradition, standards and power support public and
official trust in and respect for their independence from political,
social, or economic bias. This is reflected in judicial tenure, salary
and privilege. 25 The creation of an administrative court would add
the element of expertise in administrative law to the present sys-
tem of review, but such a proposal would not appreciably reduce
the cost of judicial review or expand its scope.26 Moreover, it has
not achieved success despite support from many lawyers, including
those of Ohio. The stature necessary to the effectiveness of a state
ombudsman could be maximized, however, by incorporating in
the office as many attributes of judicial office as is possible, con-
sistent with the ombudsman's function as critic as opposed to
commander.27
There is a notable difference between those nations utilizing
ombudsmen and the American state for which adjustment must be
made if adoption is to be successful. Judicial review of administra-
tive action, as it is understood in America, is severely limited or
virtually unknown in such nations. In Sweden, for example, the
administrator is the final authority and there is no appeal from his
determination. 2 Administrative abuses are reviewable only by way
of prosecution for criminal misconduct of the administrator. This
serves as a check on abuse of power, but provides no remedy for
the aggrieved citizen and cannot possibly redress simple error or
minor wrongs. The Swedish Justideombudsman (J.O.) has author-
ity to inquire into minor abuses which may or may not be judi-
cially reviewable in America, and a corresponding duty to con-
duct criminal prosecutions against administrators found to be
engaged in misconduct. Such a system uses an ombudsman as a broad
quasi-appellate authority and as a prosecutor, although prosecu-
tions are very few in practice. American judicial review is satis-
factory in many kinds of cases, particularly those in which the
money or interest involved warrants the cost of extensive proceed-
ings. The administrative agency is not as a practical matter the
24 See GEL~nHoR, AiEmmcANS 25-35; GWiN, supra note 10, at 54.
25 See, e.g., OHIO CONsr. art. IV, §§ 1-17 (1851); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 141.04-.07
(Page Supp. 1967) (salary of judges).
26 See Fulda, supra note 9. See also GELLoRN, AM RICANS 37-39 (Conseil d'Etat).
27 See GELLHoRN, AmERICANS 226. See also GELLHoRN, OAMUDS EN 422-26; G.
SAWYFR, OMBUDSMEN 31 (1964).
28 See GEL.LHoRN, OMuUDsEN 194-255.
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final authority but is principally a fact-finder. Moreover, American
administrators who err are not prosecuted. They. are reversed.
What is desired in adapting ombudsman to the American
state then is to import his functions with respect to relatively
minor administrative wrongs. The foreign ombudsman's prosecu-
torial powers and his jurisdiction over what might be characterized
as the upper dollar portion of the spectrum of alleged administra-
tive abuse are not required. These facets of his authority would
duplicate satisfactory, existing functions, and the summary and
advisory nature of relief through an ombudsman is not well-suited
to the resolution of the larger wrongs.
It must be noted that the practicing ombudsman is not greatly
concerned with these bigger wrongs or prosecutions.2 9 Administra-
tion is rarely so bad as to warrant prosecution, and practical wis-
dom dictates that the ombudsman apply his resources to cases
where his recommendations would be accepted by citizen and ad-
ministrator alike rather than wasting his efforts where the weight
of the adverse interests involved precludes his effectiveness. It is
the practicing ombudsman, whose daily work is with petty griev-
ances, not the ombudsman reflected in the constitutions and stat-
utes of other nations, which may have utility for the American
state. The stature and prestige provided by his prosecutorial au-
thority, and by the fact that he is frequently the only source of ad-
ministrative review, could and should be replaced in state adapta-
tion of the office by expanding on the ombudsman's judicial
characteristics.
All of the foreign ombudsmen are instruments of the legis-
lature. They are selected by or upon recommendation of the legis-
lative body and are generally answerable to it even if they function
independently. 0 None are linked with the executive branch.
Whether this is due to executive responsibility for administration
or to the fact that the executive branch is not fully independent
of the legislature in these nations is difficult to tell.31 In either
event, the independence of state executives and the part-time
nature of state legislatures suggest that a state ombudsman should
be as independent of both branches as possible. The desirability of
enhancing his judicial nature also suggests that a state ombuds-
man's salary, tenure and powers not be dependent on executive
29 See id. at 421-39.
80 GErLHoRN, AmERICANS 9; GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN 424.
21 See GELLHOmN, AMERICANS 9, 15641.
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will, and at least not directly dependent on the will of the legisla-
ture. This might require an ombudsman to be established by con-
stitutional amendment. Initially, however, statutory creation of
the office and its powers would suffice, as most state constitutions
already contain provisions relating to tenure, salaries, conduct,
bond, removal and impeachment of state officers which would pro-
tect and limit the office.32 Statutory establishment would also allow
a degree of flexibility that may be needed to refine the system
which from experience may show deficiencies.
While a state ombudsman could not effectively serve at the
pleasure of the executive, there should be no objection to his ap-
pointment by the governor or an executive committee, possibly
with the consent of the legislature. This is a traditional method
of filling vacancies in all branches of state government and it has
not depreciated the constitutional separation of powers. 3 The best
qualified and most nearly independent ombudsman would be in
the interest of an appointing executive intent on objective polic-
ing of the administrative process. Such an officer is likely to put
out more embarrassing fires than he might start, and many of the
administrators who might receive his attention are civil servants
who do not serve at the pleasure of the governor but are effectively
beyond his control.34
There is no comparable American experience, but the selec-
tion and appointment of foreign ombudsmen has not raised polit-
ical issues or demonstrated partisan choices by either legislatures
or executives. 35 The selection has usually come through a consen-
sus which emphasizes the candidates' non-political qualifications
such as education, experience, profession and even lack of political
involvement. Although the office is highly personalized by its na-
ture, and the choice of an ombudsman is most critical to its success,
there is little reason to believe that existing methods for the selec-
tion of appointees to fill vacancies would be inadequate.
A practical choice for a state ombudsman would therefore be
an officer in the nature of a judge in terms of tenure, qualifications
and privilege. He might well be appointed by the governor, but
for a term dissimilar from that of the executive, or by the legisla-
32 See, e.g., OMo CoNsr. art. II, §§ 24, 38.
33 E.g., Omo CoNsr. art. III, § 21, art. IV § 13 (interim appointment of officers
and judges).
34 See G.LLHoRN, Am=c.ANs 136-41, 217-24.
35 GELLHoRN, O=xusmN 424.
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ture or a hybrid committee, or by a combination of these. How-
ever, the term of his office should be arranged to assure indepen-
dence from both the executive and the legislature. This will allow
non-partisan, independent criticism of administration. The in-
herent limitations on his powers and the constitutional controls
over all state officers should serve adequately to check his conduct.
B. Proposed Legislation and Model Acts
Detailed analysis of the ombudsman bills introduced in all
state legislatures and all the model acts to which these bills are
closely related would be fruitless. These proposed statutes are more
remarkable for their likeness than for their dissimilarities. More-
over, many small changes are to be expected before enactment,
and it may be anticipated that the experiences of the newly created
Rhode Island and Hawaiian ombudsmen will be considered in
future enactments.
There is a consensus among the draftsmen of the various bills
as to what is required to adapt ombudsman to the states. Model
bills have been unusually influential, probably because ombuds-
man legislation is virgin territory to the states. Perhaps the most
refined of these is the model statute recently drafted by Walter
Gellhorn, which is based on a Connecticut bill and on a model
bill prepared by Harvard students, with antecedence in the New
Zealand statute.36 Professor Gellhorn's draft forms the backbone
of the bills introduced in the Ohio General Assembly. Its salient
features are:
(1) Ombudsman jurisdiction over all state administrative agen-
cies, defined broadly to exclude only the courts and the persons
and immediate staffs of the legislature and executive.
(2) Broad definition of the administrative action subject to
review by the ombudsman.
(3) Provision for control by the ombudsman of his own staff,
procedure, and the scope of his investigations.
(4) Broad investigatory powers, on complaint or on the om-
budsman's own motion, supported by the right to inspect agency files
and the power to compel production of documents and testimony.
(5) Otherwise, a complete absence of any powers of compul-
sion.
(6) Directory rather than mandatory descriptions of the kinds
36 GELLroRN, Annotated Model Ombudsman Statute, OMBUDSMEN FOR Aimxa-
CAN GovxiuNTmxNr? 159 (Appendix) (S. Anderson ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited model act].
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of abuses which may be investigated and of the kinds of complaints
which need not be investigated.
(7) Fairplay provisions requiring notice of action to complain-
ants and consultation with an agency prior to criticism.
(8) Right of ombudsman to make and publish recommenda-
tions and opinions on specific or general matters, but only if the
response of any agency criticized is included.
(9) Duty to marshal the ombudsman's experience into an an-
nual report to the legislature to facilitate evaluation of his office
and the administrative process.
(10) Judicial immunity for the ombudsman and his staff, from
testimony, review and civil liability.
(11) Express provision that resort to the ombudsman is supple-
mentary to existing legal remedies but not dependent on the exis-
tence of any legal remedy.
Important minor features of the model act include establish-
ment of the ombudsman's salary as equal to that of the chief justice
of the state, provision for a deputy to act in his absence, penal pro-
visions for obstructing the ombudsman, and a requirement that any
letter to the ombudsman which is in administrative custody be for-
warded unopened.
The model bill provides for appointment of a state ombuds-
man by the governor subject to confirmation by two-thirds of the
members of each house of the legislature. This assures broad ac-
ceptability of the appointee. It does not include any political dis-
qualification, such as the requirement of the 1965 California bill
that the appointee shall not have been a member of the legislature
during the two years preceeding appointmenty7 or any disqualifi-
cation from holding public office subsequent to serving as ombuds-
man, as has been suggested as a means of severing politics from the
office. It does require, in a rather precatory manner, that the ap-
pointee "not be actively involved in partisan affairs."38 Due to
the nature of the office, which carries virtually no power beyond
that engendered by the reputation for reason and even-handedness
achieved by the ombudsman, the qualifications and disqualifica-
tions of ombudsmen probably do not require statutory elabora-
tion. In fail-safe manner, ombudsmen simply must demonstrate
those qualities of expertise and independence that are usually
required to gain any substantial public influence. Nevertheless, the
37 A.B. 2956, Calif. Legislature, Reg. Sess., § 1 (10701) (1965).
38 Model act Sec. 5.
1969]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
method of appointment and qualifications are the points of great-
est diversity in current American proposals.
As an alternative to the model bill, a California bill created a
joint, bi-partisan, legislative committee to select and oversee the
ombudsman, subject to approval by joint legislative resolution.39
The Ohio bills propose yet two more methods. Senate Bill No.
243 proposes a blue-ribbon nominating committee to select candi-
dates, after which there is gubernatorial appointment with the ad-
vice and consent of the senate.40 Senate Bill No. 387 is the same,
except that it eliminates the nominating committee.4' The former
follows the qualifications of the model act, while the latter simply
provides that the ombudsman may not be a candidate for or hold
other office during his tenure. The particular method of selection
and qualification which might secure competent and independent
ombudsmen is a question not of logic, but of what is required in
the way of words to obtain an intelligent and non-partisan choice
by the particular state officers charged with selection. It would
appear to be a matter best left to the legislatures of each state.
Differences of opinion therein should not obscure the fact that
most of these varied provisions are aimed at securing an extra
measure of independence in the ombudsman over other appoint-
ments. The foregoing outline of the model act, and the bills which
have been based upon it, have also preserved the other two essen-
tial constitutive characteristics of successful ombudsmen. The pro-
posed ombudsmen are given no powers to compel redress, but they
are given extensive investigatory powers and the right to publicize
the results of the ombudsman's work. They would therefore have
the essential combination of fact-finding capacity without revisory
jurisdiction. This combination has produced respected recommen-
dations in other nations. What might happen between introduction
and possible passage of an ombudsman bill remains to be seen.
C. The Ohio Proposals
The ombudsman bills introduced in the 1967-1968 General
Assembly were based largely on the model bill of Professor Gell-
horn. They contain similar provisions; Senate Bill No. 387 being
39 A.B. 2956, supra note 37, § 1 (10701).
40 S.B. 243, 107th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., § 1 (sec. 118.02) (Ohio, 1967-68)
[hereinafter cited S.B. 243].
41 S.B. 387, 107th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., § I (sec. 118.02) (Ohio, 1967-68)
[hereinafter cited S.B. 387].
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shorter and less elaborate than Senate Bill No. 243. Because of the
discretionary nature of an ombudsman's work, it would not appear
that elaboration of his duties is particularly beneficial as long as
the terms of his appointment and his powers and immunities are
clearly set forth. Nor would additional guidelines appear harmful
unless they purport to be exhaustive or they impair flexibility in
handling complaints and investigation. Length is simply no mea-
sure of the quality of an ombudsman statute. Since the model bill,
which is somewhat shorter then either Ohio bill, represents a con-
sensus on what legislation is necessary for an effective state om-
budsman, the Ohio bills will be discussed in comparison to it and
their distinctions will be noted only where significant.42
The Ohio proposals apply only to state agencies. 43 This fol-
lows the lead of other states, and is perhaps necessary to avoid
conflict with the home-rule provisions of the Ohio Constitution.44
There is little distinction, however, between the kinds of griev-
ances citizens have against state or local agencies. 45 Both are likely
to be personal and relatively petty, and some, like welfare adminis-
tration, involve both state and county agencies. The model bill is
designed for adoption by state or local governments, but not both.
Undoubtedly, a state ombudsman would be hard pressed to deal
with complaints against eighty-eight county governments and hun-
dreds of municipal governments. The administrative agencies of
many such subdivisions are sufficiently small and unbureaucratic
that an ombudsman's services are largely unneeded. Furthermore,
the cost of creating and maintaining the kind of organization
needed to handle localized complaints would greatly exceed that
envisioned as the price of a state ombudsman. Nevertheless, con-
sideration should be given to local jurisdiction, particularly in the
larger cities where administrative organization may approach that
42 This discussion presumes the currency of these Ohio bills. They are not
currently being considered, but died in committee at the end of the 1967-68 legislative
session. At this writing the 1969-70 session has not been convened. Since these bills
were not considered on the floor and hearings not held on them in committee, it may
be expected that they or one of them will be reintroduced, renumbered, in the coming
or a future session, without substantial change.
43 S.B. 243, sec. 118.01(A)(5); S.B. 387, sec. 118.01(A).
44 OHIO CONSr. art. X, § I, art. XVIII, §§ 3, 7.
45 On the vagaries and limitations of administrative procedure, see OHIo REv.
CODE ANN. §§ 2506.01-.04 (Page Supp. 1967) (appeal from local agencies). See generally
ANGUS & KAPLAN, The Ombudsman and Local Government, OhinuDSMAN FOR Aum-
icAN GovERN, NT? 101-36 (S. Anderson ed. 1968).
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of some state agencies in services and size. Perhaps provision should
be made for local adoption of an ombudsman's office which would
assume the same powers, duties and immunities of the state om-
budsman, but would be limited to local agencies. Such local option
provision might provide for local appointment of a regional
deputy ombudsman, coordinate or subordinate to the state officer,
who would function locally. This omission is not a defect in these
bills, as a local option provision might be added at any time. It
would seem, however, that early consideration might prevent dis-
organized and uncoordinated local efforts to establish ombudsmen
which might lack the essential characteristics needed in the office.
Both Ohio bills broadly define "administrative agency" and
"administrative act" which limit the jurisdiction of the ombuds-
man. Senate Bill No. 243 expressly exempts from the agency defini-
tion, the General Assembly, the governor, the courts, the attorney
general and political subdivisions.46 It would seem preferable to
avoid the practice of listing exceptions. Elected officials and their
personal staffs can be generally excepted on the premise that elec-
tion is a sufficient control and such persons are clearly not ad-
ministrative agencies. Otherwise, enumerated exceptions invite
more, and might easily include purely administrative functions
organized peculiarly or uniquely under a non-agency-e.g., an in-
vestigative arm of the domestic relations courts. The preferable
form is to supply a basic definition and then to rely on the discre-
tion of the ombudsman to know what agencies are appropriately
within his jurisdiction.
Both bills provide for six year terms, control of the selection
and compensation of the ombudsman's own employees, including
the deputy authorized to act in his absence, and for a salary equal
to the Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court, currently $32,000
annually.47 These provisions follow the model bill and bring the
term into line with that of Ohio judges. Both provide that the
ombudsman's action shall not be judicially reviewable and that
neither he nor his staff shall testify concerning his work, except
where necessary to enforce the obstruction penalties, or the sub-
poena power, or where his action is reviewed on grounds that he lacks
jurisdiction or is acting in bad faith. This latter exception to non-re-
viewability does not appear in the model act. It presumably opens
up injunctive remedies should the ombudsman exceed his intended
46 S.B. 243, sec. 118.01(A).
47 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 141.04(A) (Page Supp., 1967).
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authority. Its need is questionable. If he should exceed his statutory
jurisdiction, such remedies would be available irrespective of ex-
press authority, and the bad faith provision would be no more
effective than the situation existing with respect to judges against
whom no similar provisions are directed. The bills improve upon
the model act, however, by providing "the same immunities from
civil and criminal liability as a judge."48 This clearly makes ap-
plicable the entire body of law pertaining to judicial immunity.
The model bill simply reads, "No civil action shall lie * * * for
anything done or said or omitted, in discharging the responsibili-
ties contemplated by this Act,"49 which requires interpretation.
Both bills closely follow the model act's enumeration of wrongs
appropriate for investigation, which appear to be sufficiently gen-
eral to avoid undue restriction. Both incorporate four of the seven
model act grounds for declining investigation, although Senate Bill
No. 387 imposes a one-year limitation on filing complaints, while
the others treat delay as a mere factor. The omitted grounds include
lack of interest by the complainant, insufficiency of resources, and
lack of importance. While it is important that an ombudsman not
be given statutory authority to shirk, it is imperative that he be
given some discretion to avoid the kinds of cases which his experi-
ence informs him cannot be resolved under his limited powers. Any
requirements that he must investigate all cases coming within his
apparent powers would force him to try where he can do no good
and thus dissipate his real power.
The Ohio bills follow the model act in providing that the
ombudsman may review final, unappealable agency action, but they
fail to expressly provide that resort to the ombudsman is supple-
mentary to all other remedies on appeals. The model bill might be
improved by adding that review by the ombudsman is voluntary;
and if it is not elected, it should not be interpreted as an adequate
remedy at law or an administrative remedy to be exhausted prior
to judicial review. Clearly stating the relationship between the
ombudsman and judicial and administrative remedies cannot hurt
and might possibly avoid misinterpretation in the appellate process.
Senate Bill No. 243 and the model act enumerate the kinds of
recommendations the ombudsman may make, including whether
"any other action should be taken by the agency." 50 Senate Bill No.
48 S.B. 243, sec. 118.17; S.B. 387, sec. 118.15.
49 Model act, sec. 17(b).
G0 S.B. 243, sec. 118.13(E); Model act, sec. 13(a)(5).
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387 properly omits such specification, for any recommendation not
falling in the first three categories would fall in the latter. The
point of specificity in the model bill was that when such specified
wrongs were discovered which warranted agency action, the om-
budsman should report to the agency.51 The point is lost in the
Ohio versions which apparently require reports to both the agency
and the complainant in all cases investigated. "2
The investigatory powers provided in the Ohio bills follow
substantially those of the model act with respect to access to agency
files, records and offices. The subpoena provisions are modified to
conform with Ohio law. The subpoena powers are not directly en-
forced, by notaries public, but by application to the court of com-
mon pleas.53 The draftsmen of Senate Bill No. 243 recognized the
availability of fact-finding and audit services in the Bureau of In-
spection and Supervision of Public Offices and have provided that
that agency should assist, when requested, in cases involving actions
within the authority of the bureau.54 A more surprising addition to
the model draft is the immunity extended by both bills to persons
testifying or simply giving information in the course of investigation.
Both provided that, except in a perjury trial, no statement given is
admissible evidence in court or in any administrative proceeding.55
This feature is undoubtedly intended to facilitate investigation, but
it would seem to be a rather large price to pay in view of the rela-
tively trivial nature of matters investigated. Since both bills excuse
the ombudsman and staff from testimony regarding their work, and
since their records are non-public, such suppression of reliable ad-
missions and statements seems unwarranted. The immunity provi-
sions come almost verbatim from the 1965 California bill, except
that it limited the exclusion of evidence to subsequent criminal
and administrative proceedings. 56 In either instance, the confiden-
tial relationship engendered between ombudsman and complainant
or witness is not inconsistent with his duty to remain independent
and his function to mediate disputes.
There are many other distinctions between the Ohio bills, the
model bill and those introduced in other states. Most are unimpor-
51 Model act, sec. 13 & comment thereto.
52 S.B. 243, sec. 118.13; S.M. 387, sec. 118.13 (cases warranting action only).
53 S.B. 243, sec. 118.11(B); S.B. 387, sec. 118.11(B).
54 S.B. 243, sec. 118.15. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 117.01-.19 (Page 1953), as
amended, (Page Supp., 1967).
55 S.B. 243, sec. 118.11(D); S.B. 387, sec. 118.11(D).
G6 See A.B. 2956, supra note 37, § 1 [10722(e)].
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tant, and, in fact, the mechanical details of ombudsman legislation
are probably not critical to his effectiveness as long as the essential
elements are there. The practicing foreign ombudsmen have vastly
differing legal authority, yet all behave and work very much alike
and with similar effectiveness. Their compulsory powers are rarely
used. The scope of their work is shaped more by the kinds of cases
wherein they achieve results than by their written legal authority.
Perhaps it would suffice to enact, without more, that there shall
be an officer appointed by someone who shall serve a term of years
and be paid so much and shall undertake the powers and duties of
an ombudsman. This would be much like the constitutional grants
of judicial power to the courts which exercise great compulsory
power effectively, with little more limitation.67 Seriously, however,
there is a premium on brevity and generality in such legislation.
It affords needed flexibility, and the nature of the office may be re-
lied upon to check abuse of the authority given.
In comnion with most American ombudsman proposals, the
Ohio bills contain a provision for annual reports to the governor
and the General Assembly."' Senate Bill No. 243 further requires
that he make a continuing evaluation of general administrative
procedure for the purpose of recommending improvement and
legislation. 9 Such provisions are rarely found governing foreign
ombudsmen who must usually make an annual account but are not
obligated to furnish legislative advice. Some do voluntarily, and
they are undoubtedly the most reliable source for discovery of prob-
lem areas in the citizen-administration relationship. The double
utility obtained by imposing on the ombudsman this advisory func-
tion would seem to be a bargain partially overlooked abroad.
The distinctions between the Ohio proposals and the model
act are important. Some are decided improvements while others
seem undesirable. Neither Ohio bill is distinctly the better. The
greater length of Senate Bill No. 243 sometimes provides refine-
ment over Senate Bill No. 387, sometimes confusion. Both appear
to preserve the essential characteristics for an effective ombudsman.
The proposition before the General Assembly is not only
whether one of these bills, with or without amendment, would pro-
duce an effective ombudsman, but whether Ohio desires an om-
budsman as that office is generally understood.
57 See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 1.
Gs S.B. 243, sec. 118.16; S.B. 387, sec. 118.14.
59 $.3. 243, sec. 118.16.
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V. THE CASE FOR OMBUDSMAN IN OHIO
The merits of ombudsmen have been debated at length else-
where. It is not seriously questioned that ombudsmen, as a general
idea, are a good thing.60 Most observers agree that the office, as es-
tablished by most state bills and the model bill, would work in
the American state, assuming the need. Ombudsmania in both pro-
ponents and opponents has and will continue to support debate
which never really reaches the decisive question of whether there is
sufficient business for an ombudsman to warrant the cost of the of-
fice and the risk that it may not work quite as planned.
The following discussion assumes the feasibility of an Ohio
ombudsman, and is directed at the need for one.
A. The Business of an Ombudsman
Disputes between citizens and administrative agencies may be
divided into three classes with respect to the quality of available
remedies.
First, there is the big case, which involves a substantial claim
and in which the administrative determination is legally, and as a
practical matter, subject to complete or nearly complete judicial
review. The big case is exemplified by public utility litigation,
wherein rates, routes and certification of public convenience and
necessity involve large financial interests willing and able to
employ counsel, build records and prosecute appeals fully. Any de-
fects that exist in review of such cases are inherent in the delega-
tion of decision making powers from all three branches of govern-
ment to the administrative agency. An ombudsman is powerless to
reverse such administrative determinations or to add much to the
integrity of the administrative process and is therefore incapable of
improving administration in this class of dispute. His participation
in this class of cases could add only delay and confusion to the al-
ready complex process, and would likely be invoked only for such
60 A rare judicial comment comes from Arthur J. (then Mr. Justice) Goldberg:
In Scandinavia that excellent institution called Ombudsman assists the ordinary
citizen in seeing that the law is not administered with an evil eye or an uneven
hand. He also assists the public official by clearing the air of unfounded charges.
In both ways the Ombudsman helps safeguard the integrity of equal protec-
tion. The Ombudsman-or rather the idea it embodies-appropriately adapted
to our governmental institutions, towns, cities, states, and even the Nation,
could help in the realization of our ideal of equal treatment of all citizens by
government officials.
Goldberg, Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 204, 215 (1964).
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undesirable purposes. 61 There is accordingly no business for an om-
budsman in this kind of dispute.
A second class of disputes is the little case. This class is not
legally distinguishable from the former class for it includes a jus-
ticiable claim for which administrative appeal or judicial review is
legally available. The distinction is practical. The little case typi-
cally involves a small, personal claim. The amount or value of the
interest in controversy does not warrant the fees of counsel or the
cost and delay of appeals. The need for any administrative award
given may be so immediate that the claimant cannot afford the de-
lay for review, if indeed the right of appeal is understood. Low fees
may have limited effectiveness of counsel, which also may have
contributed to the omission of material facts from the administra-
tive record. In turn, the administrative determination may be fact-
bound, that is, unfair but unreversible because of support in the
record and great deference to the administrative determination of
fact. Such defects in decision-making are not peculiar to adminis-
trative agencies, but would also occur in judicial resolution of the
same kinds of disputes. This does little to satisfy the aggrieved
citizen, however, and his dissatisfaction with government may be
heightened by the fact that it was a bureaucrat rather than a judge
who ruled unfavorably. In this class of disputes, an ombudsman
cannot be expected to secure numerous modifications of adminis-
trative decisions, for the vast majority of such decisions are essen-
tially correct. He may be expected to offer such complainants
explanation and assurance which will tend to correct dissatisfaction
based on misunderstanding and misinformation. He may occasion-
ally persuade an agency to reconsider and alter its decision where
an injustice has actually occurred. Together with the third class,
the little case provides the business of an ombudsman.
The third class of disputes is the non-case. It includes all kinds
of grievances which are non-justiciable, those for which no legal
remedy has or can be fashioned. There is, for example, no prece-
dent for an award, decision or judgment of apology, yet it would
be an appropriate remedy in many instances. This class also in-
cludes grievances stemming from the failure to adequately present
a claim for agency determination and those due to the failure to
comprehend the nature of such a determination once it is made.
61 Ombudsman bills routinely excuse investigation when there is another, ade-
quate remedy available to the complainant. Model act, sec. 11(a)(1); SJX. 243, sec.
118.07(A); $.B. 387, sec. 118.07(A).
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The non-case is presently handled largely by the agencies them-
selves, although members of the executive and legislative branches,
and outsiders, will occasionally become involved.6 2 While the little
case is fairly well understood, particularly by lawyers, very little is
known of the dimensions of the non-case and thus there is a cor-
responding need for an ombudsman in this latter class.
B. The Little Case in Ohio
Ohio administrative procedure is not atypical of that prevail-
ing in other states.63 The Administrative Procedure Acts defines
"agency" and "adjudication" broadly,6 4 and provides for notice and
hearing in both rule-making and adjudication actions. 5 The hear-
ing contemplated is not greatly dissimilar from a trial in the courts
with respect to participation by counsel, cross-examination and ad-
missibility of evidence.66 Provision is made for appeal from the
administrative ruling to the courts of common pleas, which func-
don essentially as appellate courts, and therefrom as in other civil
cases. 67 The scope of review is limited to determination by the
courts of whether the administrative ruling is supported by re-
liable, probative and substantial evidence and whether it is in ac-
cordance with law.68
Several agencies are expressly excluded from the application of
the act." Of these, some like the Public Utilities Commission have
no bearing on the need for an ombudsman because they typically
handle only the big case. However, the Industrial Commission and
the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, which handle a great
volume of small, personal claims, are excluded and are controlled by
special procedural statutes. These statutes alter the basic scheme of
the act by inserting administrative appeals"0 and by providing work-
men's compensation claimants with a right to a jury determination
62 See MOORE, supra note 3, at 73-101.
63 Compare Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 119.01-.13 (Page 1953), as amended, (Page
Supp. 1967) with Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 9c Uniform Laws Ann. 174
(1957). See GELLHoRN & BYSE, supra note 10, at 1231-32 8& n.3.
64 Omo REv. CODE ANN. 99 119.01(A),(D) (Page Supp. 1967).
65 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. 9§ 119.03, .06-.07 (Page 1953).
66 See OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 119.09 (Page 1953).
67 Onso REv. CODE ANN. § 119.12 (Page Supp. 1967).
68 Id.; e.g., Henry's Cafe, Inc. v. Board of Liquor Control, 170 Ohio St. 233, 163
N.E.2d 678 (1959).
69 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 119.01(A) (Page Supp. 1967).
70 Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4123.516 (Page 1953), 4141.28(H)-(J) (Page Supp. 1967).
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of their right to participate in the fund.71 They change the scope of
review in unemployment compensation cases to a determination of
whether the administrative decision was unlawful, unreasonable or
against the manifest weight of the evidence.72 The Workmen's Com-
pensation Act also limits the matters which may be reviewed by pro-
viding that a decision in any injury case, other than the extent of
disability, is appealable.73 The Supreme Court of Ohio has inter-
preted this provision as barring appeals in occupational disease
cases, thus making the agency determination final in this increasing
source of claims. 74
The foregoing example of restricted judicial review of Ohio ad-
ministrative decision is perhaps not entirely representative, but it is
a severe restriction in a fertile area of small cases, and other instances
exist.75 From the outline given, it can be seen that the Ohio act is
generally intended to preserve procedural due process while impart-
ing to the administrative determination a degree of finality which
is greatest, even total, in the little case. Undoubtedly, such statutory
and judicial limitation on review is an economic necessity, inherent
in the delegation of decision-making powers to administrative agen-
cies. Complete duplication of the agency's work in the process of
judicial review would defeat the basic utility of agencies in relieving
the other branches of government from specialized casework. Never-
theless, the legal finality accorded administrative determinations in
little cases, together with the practical finality resulting from the cost
and delay of the multiplicity of appeals necessary to reach the courts
in such cases, means that judicial review is simply not available to
Ohio citizens in many little cases, and is inadequate to correct abuses
of discretion in others.76
The question is whether an Ohio ombudsman could improve
on the present division of decision-making responsibility between
agencies and courts in little cases. If he were only to substitute for
71 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.519 (Page Supp. 1967).
72 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4141.28(0) (Page Supp. 1967).
73 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.519 (Page Supp. 1967).
74 Szekely v. Young, 174 Ohio St. 213, 188 N.E2d 424 (1963). See also State ex rel.
Marshall v. Keller, 15 Ohio St. 2d 203, 239 N.E.2d 85 (1968).
75 E.g., in Hercules Gallon Products, Inc. v. Bowers, 171 Ohio St. 176, 168 N.E.2d
404 (1960), the court held the provisions for direct appeal from decisions of the Board
of Tax Appeals did not make the court a "super" board of tax appeals. See also Bd. of
Revision v. Fodor, 15 Ohio St. 2d 52, 239 N.E.2d 25 (1968).
76 The ground of abuse of discretion is apparently no longer a standard for
reversal of an administrative decision in Ohio. Ganson v. Board of Liquor Control,
70 Ohio L. Abs. 242, 127 NX.2d 890 (C. P. 1953).
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administrative or judicial review, then he would function as a super-
agency or special court, and improvement would be questionable.
However, the proposed ombudsman is not such a substitute, but is
unique to the present system. Unlike the courts, he would have
initiative and investigatory powers aimed at the discovery of fact in-
dependent of adversary proceedings. Having no revisory jurisdiction,
his method could be quite summary. Unlike the agencies, he would
appear less bureaucratic and he would be under no duty to reach a
decision. Accordingly, review by the ombudsman in the little case
would be cheap, but uncertain. It would seem that certainty is pos-
sible only through full judicial review, and that is too costly in many
little cases. It would also seem that an ombudsman would offer a
source of redress where none is presently available, and where there
is a great volume of transactions between Ohio citizens and agencies
-the little case.
Examination of the process in the little case tends to obscure a
function of an ombudsman which is perhaps more important than
that of providing a cheap, alternative form of appeal. Ombudsmen
have been successful in other nations despite their limited power to
correct administrative error because they have been able to secure
satisfaction for aggrieved citizens. Such satisfaction comes not only
from cases where ombudsmen have been able to persuade adminis-
trators to change an unjust determination, but also from cases where
all that was needed to redress the complaint was an explanation by
the ombudsman or the agency of the determination made, or just the
assurance of an independent critic that it was correct.
The cost, and possible loss of appeals in small, personal claims
are not readily written off as an expense of doing business. The per-
sonal nature of many such little cases creates unreasonable expecta-
tions in both the substance and the manner of its disposition. The
legalese and red tape developed by many agencies in handling large
numbers of little claims does nothing to dispel the conviction of the
claimant that an adverse ruling was unjust. The explanation or as-
surance of an ombudsman can add some sugar to this bitter medicine
of defeat. Ombudsman is an investment in both the legal and mental
well-being of citizens doing business with administrative agencies.
The substantive restrictions on judicial review of administrative
agency decisions in Ohio would seem to make judicial review imprac-
tical in many small cases, and review by an ombudsman accordingly
appropriate. It is difficult to say whether these alone would warrant
[Vol. so
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the cost of an ombudsman, but it is dear that there would be busi-
ness for an Ohio ombudsman.
Where the grievance of the citizen in the little case actually
pertains to the manner rather than the substance of the administra-
tive determination-e.g., where inadequate explanation is given-it
is a non-case.
C. Non-Cases in Ohio
Classification of grievances as non-cases reflects the fact that they
are not supported by legal rights. Accordingly, there is no statutory
provision for judicial review of administrative action giving rise to
such non-justiciable disputes in Ohio or elsewhere. This kind of dis-
pute exists largely between persons rather than parties, but it be-
comes important to government when it is between citizens and em-
ployees of government agencies, particularly when it is related to the
citizen's acceptance of an agency decision in a legally cognizable case.
The administrative agency lacks the reputation for indepen-
dence and the formality of courts in resolving claims, and is thus
less convincing to the citizen. Moreover, it has been given the thank-
less job of administering expanding programs of government services
involving great numbers of relatively small value transactions and
great public contact. Each disappointed beneficiary of such programs
has a potential non-case. The reports of foreign ombudsmen contain
many instances where they have satisfied complaints by explana-
tion or assurance, or have secured a change in administrative process-
ing to forestall recurring grievances of this kind.7 7 There is very little
American data on this class of grievance, 78 and none in Ohio, but it
is apparent that the agencies themselves are resolving such non-case
complaints when they are voiced.
In an effort to determine what non-case business an Ohio om-
budsman might have, I surveyed those Ohio state administrative
agencies which appear to have substantial public contact.7 9 The re-
sponse was incomplete, and with one exception, there were no records
77 See, e.g., ROWAT, supra note 15, at 18-22.
78 See MooRE, supra note 3, at 70-73, 100.
79 The survey was made by questionnaire mailed with an explanatory letter to
the directors or other heads of fifteen Ohio agencies. The agencies were informed that
the general results were intended for publication in an academic article on the handling
of minor complaints, but to avoid prejudiced response, the subject of ombudsman was
not mentioned. Minor boards, bureaus and commissions, and those bodies functioning
essentially as staff to legislative or executive officials were not contacted.
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of complaints"0 available. Several agencies furnished estimates of
their non-case business, and all that responded furnished helpful nar-
ratives of their complaint handling procedure. The results presented
here are not exhaustive and possibly are not entirely representative.
They are what a few agencies say is happening and may therefore be
less than objective, but without apology they are all that is avail-
able. The principal defects in the data gathered, the lack of records
and the failure of several important agencies to respond, do not
destroy the value of what was found. What is needed to determine
the existence of non-case business in Ohio is not a complete account
but a sample measure of such business from which it might reason-
ably be determined whether there is sufficient business of this class,
together with business from little cases, to warrant an ombudsman.
Of fifteen agencies surveyed, nine responded and three furnished
statistical data based on estimates of personnel familiar with the
overall operation of the agency. One of these three maintained a
formal card file system to account for complaints received. Because
of large differences in the nature and volume of public contacts be-
tween the agencies, and their somewhat dissimilar responses, aggre-
gation of results is not instructive. The data from the three agencies
will therefore be tabulated:
AgencySl: "A" '"B" "C"
Annual citizen's complaints:8 2  3521 1500 200
Source-citizen-written: 2945 1250 125
-telephone: 516 200 50
-visit: 60 50 25
-legislative: 25 60 20
---e.xecutive: 20 15 25
-- other state official: 100 5 20
-federal: 15 15 2
-attorneys: 20 200 50
-others: 150 15 100
-mental patient, prisoner: nominal nominal to 5%
80 The agencies were asked to include as a complaint,
any expression of dissatisfaction by a citizen or business organization to the
agency, whether written or oral, formal or informal, irrespective of its merit
or validity, and irrespective of the power of the agency to provide a remedy.
They were also asked to exclude appeals taken within the agency or to the courts.
81 In an effort to avoid self-effacing answers, the agencies were assured their
particular responses would not be identified. Although the findings contain nothing
derogatory, but rather reflect generally commendable attitudes, the limited anonymity
will be preserved by alphabetical designations.
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Agency "A" 7, which had a card system on complaints, is re-
sponsible for supervising the operations of county agencies. It is the
county units which have jurisdiction over virtually all matters per-
taining to individual citizens. Accordingly, the vast majority of
complaints were referred to the local agencies for resolution, and no
83 Apparently due to an ambiguity in the question format, the numbers reported
in these categories did not correlate to totals reported. Percentages were given by
agency "B", and the numbers given by the other agencies were converted to per-
centages for comparison purposes.
The nature or substance of a complaint is not simply classified. There is no ready
agreement on proper categories and individual complaints overlap some of those
fashioned here. These findings are presented, however, because they give some idea of
the relative numbers of different kinds of complaints.
84 Some percentages reported, but correlation with totals not apparent. See note
83 supra.
S5 The classification is a term of art in this agency, and got a misleading response.
86 Automatically done in all cases.
87 See note 81 supra.
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other action was taken by the state agency. While this agency fur-
nished the most accurate data on the source of complaints, it could
give little information on their nature as it did not actually resolve
them. It nevertheless documented over 3500 individual grievances
in the year ending July 1, 1968.
Agency "B" is more typical. It is a traditional, executive agency,
engaged in providing indirect government services. It estimated re-
ceipt of over 1500 complaints annually, with some of every nature
specified. Over two-thirds of these grievances concerned economic
discrimination, which is likely to be fact-bound for purposes of re-
view. It also reported dispositions in every category, but the greatest
number of complaints were resolved with an explanation.
Agency "C" is a purely regulatory agency, engaged principally
in licensing and enforcement functions. Its main adverse public
contact is with licensees whose legal remedies are ordinarily adequate,
either because they fall within the big case category or because they
are chargeable as a business expense. It nevertheless estimated over
300 annual complaints of all kinds. Disposition of these was made
almost entirely by explanation or by advising the complainant of his
rights of appeal.
The narrative descriptions of the complaint handling methods
that were furnished by these three agencies, and by the other agen-
cies which responded but were unable to provide data, reflected a
variety of more or less formal procedures. Differences were primarily
related to differing office organization, and were not significant.
None maintained a central complaint department although com-
plaints were routinely sent to a single officer, division, or kind of
division. Complaints were usually investigated by personnel familiar
with the subject matter, but were then referred to a supervisor, often
to the administrator or director personally, for response. All agencies
reported that they followed-up and answered every complaint.
In addition to the data tabulated, agencies "B" and "C", which
actually resolved all complaints received, stated respectively that
"only a very few" and "15%" of the complaints received were of the
type for which an appeal within the agency or to the courts was
both available and ordinarily taken. Accordingly, only 50 or so of the
more than 1800 complaints reported by these two agencies were
justiciable in practice, and the vast majority were little cases or non-
cases, appropriate for review by an ombudsman. These same agencies
reported 5%0 and 15%o of their respective complaints were found to
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have some merit and to warrant some corrective action, however
minor.
Despite the limitations noted, the results of this survey reflect
the basic dimensions of minor grievance handling in three widely
different kinds of Ohio agencies. It is perhaps a fairly representative
sampling of the quantities and qualities of non-cases in Ohio. The
narrative statements received from half of the dozen remaining
agencies which appear to have substantial numbers of transactions
with individual citizens reflect similar methods and do not suggest
that the quantity, sources, nature or disposition of complaints in
other agencies would be greatly different.
The survey shows over 5000 complaints annually in three
of fifteen relevant agencies. The vast majority of these are non-cases
and a substantial number have some merit. The greatest numerical
disposition of these complaints is made with an explanation or the
giving of information, and there is some indication that agency
decisions and procedures are changed in a few cases.
It may be unsafe to project these findings mathematically to all
Ohio agencies, and it certainly cannot be inferred that such totals
as there may be would comprise the casework of an Ohio ombudsman.
Many such complaints would never be made to an ombudsman, and
the disposition of the agency in many or even most of these instances
may be entirely satisfactory. But an agency is highly interested in
maintaining its own position and is dearly adverse to complaints
directed at it. Its opinion on the merits of a non-case is not partic-
ularly convincing even if essentially correct. An ombudsman would
offer an avenue of redress through independent, disinterested criti-
cism which is not presently available.
The non-case in Ohio would appear to provide hundreds, and
perhaps thousands of grievances annually which are appropriately
the business of an ombudsman. 8
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Unquestionably, subsisting Ohio administrative law leaves some
citizens with small, personal daims without any practical form of
appellate remedy for an adverse administrative determination of
88 The New Zealand Ombudsman received 799 complaints, investigated 444 of
these, and recommended some remedial action in 56 of 351 completed investigations in
the year ending March 31, 1967. The Swedish J. 0. handles about 1200 complaints a
year, 15-20% requiring some remedial action. RoWAT, supra note 15, at 11, 17.
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their little case. The real question is whether existing remedies are
so inadequate to secure the welfare and satisfaction of Ohioans as
to warrant reform. Similarly several thousands of non-justiciable
complaints are made yearly to Ohio agencies by citizens aggrieved in
some personally important manner. Again, the real question is
whether the existing methods of resolving these disputes are so
defective as to warrant reform. The reform proposed is the establish-
ment of an ombudsman in Ohio, an institution by its nature adapted
to deal with kinds of disputes in which review is legally or econom-
ically inadequate at present.
Two factors would seem determinative of the desirability of
an ombudsman in Ohio. One is the need for such an institution.
Resort to an ombudsman is voluntary and alternative to appeal or
the direct presentation of a complaint to an agency. All that can be
shown here is that appeal in many little cases is impractical under
Ohio law, and that there is a great volume of non-case complaints
now handled by the agencies themselves with the inherent short-
comings of self-criticism. Whether Ohioans with these kinds of griev-
ances would apply to an ombudsman would depend as much upon
the publicity and reputation for success achieved by the office as
upon its designed capability. There is dearly a great potential busi-
ness for an Ohio ombudsman. Whether this potential warrants the
reform comes down to one's own experience with the value of exist-
ing redress in little cases and non-justiciable disputes.
The second factor is the feasibility of an ombudsman in Ohio.
Feasibility of a state ombudsman depends upon the statutory basis
of the office and upon the public and the official acceptance of the in-
stitution. In the virtually unanimous opinion of commentators and
many state legislative draftsmen, the model act contains the essential
elements necessary for the successful adaptation of the institution
to American state government. Based on the model act; the Ohio
bills appear to preserve the three essential constitutive character-
istics of successful foreign ombudsmen, independence, great fact-
finding capability, and absence of compulsory, revisory powers.
Although there are important distictions between each of the Ohio
proposals, and the model act, which merit consideration, it would
appear that an enactment substantially like either of the two recent
bills would provide a sound legal basis for an Ohio ombudsman.
The acceptance of an ombudsman, his services, opinions, and
recommendations, by Ohio citizens and governmental officials is more
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difficult to predict. The statutes proposed would tend to assure
the requisite independence and at least invite the kind of case selec-
tion, investigation, reasoning and recommendations that would
secure public and official trust, reliance and utilization of an om-
budsman. The necessary qualities of fairness and discretion cannot,
however, be legislated. The choice of an ombudsman would require
great care, particularly with the initial appointment. 9 It would be
he who sets the pace and establishes the critical reputation of the
office, while the public and administrators watch with unreasonable
expectation of successes or failures. The risk that an intemperate
incumbent might destroy the utility of ombudsman has not been
realized in other countries, and is probably not great in the American
state, but it should be recognized in considering adoption.
An ombudsman might also fail to satisfy supporters who expect
too much of the office. It must be recognized that an ombudsman
would not be able to placate every aggrieved citizen or convince every
erring administrator of an injustice.90 The force of persuation is lim-
ited and simply not sufficient to settle some kinds of administrative
disputes. The point of ombudsman is that it works with consensus
rather than compulsion. Where compulsory power is necessary to
achieve the result, an ombudsman will fail. There is a substantial
danger that an ombudsman might be adopted with an unreasonable
expectation of what he might accomplish. If, as a result, the wrong
measure of success is applied, the reputation of the office would be
depreciated and maximum utility lost.
Should these risks materialize, the value of the institution would
be diminished, but the nature of the office is such that it could fail
only in becoming partially effective or simply uneconomical. Since
an ombudsman has little authority, a bad one could cause little dis-
ruption of the administrative process but would instead receive fewer
complaints and little attention. As a reform, ombudsman is relatively
cheap91 and fail-safe. It would appear to offer a decided improvement
to the existing Ohio administrative process. The proposal merits the
most serious consideration.
89 See GELLHoRN, AmamncANs 182.
90 See id. at 224-32.
91 The New Zealand Ombudsman serves 2V million people with a staff of four,
and reports that 10 million, Ohio's population, could be served with expansion.
G. SAwYE, OmBausmES 32 (1964).
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